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INDIAN CEMENT CARTEL: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
- Suzanne Rab*

INTRODUCTION

On 20 June, 2012, the Competition Commission ofIndia ("CCI") issued an
order finding that eleven cement companies and the Cement Manufacturers
Association ("CMA") (together, the "Opposite Parties") had infringed the
Indian competition law prohibition of anti-competitive agreements contained
in section 3 of the Indian Competition Act 2002 ("Competition Act"). !
According to the CCl, the cement companies have conspired together to
reduce or restrict their cement output in order to create a situation of short
supply, thereby increasing prices. The CCl also maintains that the companies
frequently engaged with one another at events and meetings of the CMA,
where the industry association allegedly provided a means for the cement
manufacturers to exchange commercially sensitive information which faci litated
parallel pricing, limits on production and market sharing. The CCl imposed
total pen alties amounting to 60 billion rupees, representing the highest
penalties it had imposed in any one case up to then. In respect of each cement
manufacturer, the CCl imposed a penalty amounting to 0.5 times of their
net profit for 2009-10 and 2010-11 and, in respect of the CMA, it imposed
a penalty amounting to ten per cent of total receipts of the CMA for the two

•

This article is based on a suppl em ent [Q the book "Indian Competition Law: An
Intern ational Perspective" by the sam e author and published by the same author. It is
reproduced here with kind permission.

The author would like to thank colleagues James M. Griffin, Kevin R. Sullivan and Brian
Meiners for their co mments and insights in the preparation of this work.

Case 29 /2010 , Order of20 June 2012 (Henceforth "Order").
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years. The CMA has been ordered to discontinue collecting wholesale and retail
prices from members and circulating their production and distribution details .
The case has attracted considerable attention in India and in the international
antitrust community. First, there remains considerable uncertainty on the nature
and quality of evidence that is required to support a finding of infringement
under section 3 of the Competition Act in the absence of direct evidence (i.e.,
written or oral evidence or an admission that the parties concluded an agreement
to restrict competition) . In this case, the CCl relies entirely on indirect evidence
(i.e., circumstantial evidence' including parallel price increases which the CCI
uses to suppOrt a finding of infringement by deduction or inference) . Second,
the penalties in this case are considerable by any standards, yet they have been
imposed in circumstances where there was no statutory or CCl guidance on the
factors that the CCl will take into account when determining the level of penalties
up to the maximum level permitted by law. This lack of guidance may create a
situation potentially leading to unpredictability and allegations of unfair treatment
in specific cases. Third, the Order has been appealed before the Competition
Appellate Tribunal ("COMPAT") whose final judgment is awaited'
Indian competition law bears a close similarity with the competition law of
other jurisdictions (most notably those of the European Union ("EU") and
the United States on whose laws the Competition Act was modelled. Given
this close similarity, observers have commented that it wo Id assist if laws
and procedures governing competitor interactions are not materially different
in India to those in other countries, without sound reason to disti nguish the
posi tion in India. Achieving greater congruence would, it is argued, contribute
to promoting sustained and increased inward investment in India.

2

In this work the expressions "indirect evidence" and "circumstantial evidence" are used

3

At the time of writing, the Order is subject to appeal before COM PAT. In their petitions.
the cement firms and the CMA are reponed to have requested COM PAT to quash the
entire Order. The full details of the individual appeals are not availahle publicly. Against

interchangeably.

that background, this work focuses on those particular issues and arguments that have
been particularl y prominent in the administrative procedure before eel and which arc
set out in the submissions of
Opposite Parties in the Order.

me

2
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The comparison with the EU is especially pertinent, not only in view of the
similariry between the legal systems, but also the administrative nature of the
competition law procedures in India in this case, which have counterparts in
the EU.
It follows that now more than ever is the right time ro address the international

implications of the Order and for businesses and their advisots ro continue
ro engage with the CCI, COM PAT and the Indian Government ro seek ro
clarifY, as far as possible, the practical application of the Competition Act and
particularly section 3 in alleged cases of cartelisation for this and other cases.
This review :
provides a summary description of the legal and factual background ro the
Order and the basis on which the CCI imposed penalties in order ro set in
context the debate that follows; describes the relevance of an international
and particularly EU comparative analysis to demonstrate that the definitional,
evidential and procedural issues arising in this case are not unique to India and
that a comparative assessment may bring useful insights for the application of
the relevant law in India in this and other cases; identifies a number of key areas
where the CCI in its Order has encountered issues which have been faced in
the EU competition law system' and considers the relevance of that experience
when reviewing the Order. Reflecting the central theme of this review, it focuses
on the fact that the CCI has found a cartel based exclusively on circumstantial
evidence and imposed penalties without adequately - at least by reference to
EU standards - explaining:
(I)

the significance of the evidence it relied on and how that evidence met the
standard of proof required to conclude that an anti-competitive agreement
did exist; and

(2)

irs methodology for arriving at the level of fines imposed;

4

The focus of this review is on a comparison wirh the EU as being the jurisdiction wiTh
which the author has the greatest experience as a practitioner. while recognising that
similar learning may be gained from other jurisdictions.

3
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concludes with an assessment of the lessons learned fro m the comparative
analysis as applied in this case for a review of the Order itself. It also refl ects
on the implications for the futu re development ofindian competition law and
the CCl's procedures more generally. This analysis is certainly not intended
ro be a post mortem of the decis ion. The overall objective is ro continue the
commentary I have begun in previous writings on this subj ect. It is hoped that
through comparative assessment the evolving Indian competition regime will
both benefit from the international comparative experience and contribute
its own experience to ongoing debate and development of app roaches to
competition enforcement internationally.

SUMMARY OF THE ORDER
Finding
The cel finds the eleven cement manufactu rers and the CMA have been
engaged in a cartel whereby they have "institutionalized the system of sharing
the prices, capacities and production among each other using the platform of
CMA in order to limit and control the production and supplies and determine
prices of cement in the market."S
The period of contravention according to the CCI relates t the period from
enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Competition Act to the end
of the period examined by the Director General 6 (i.e., 10 May, 2009 to 3 I
March, 20 II).

Legal Basis
The legal basis for the CCl's finding is the prohibition on restrictive
agreements contained in section 3 of the Competition Act , which provides
that "{n}o enterprise or association o/enterprises or person or association a/p ersons
shall enter into any agreement in respect o/production, supply. distribution, storage,

5
6

O rder, paragraph 6.13.
T he Director Gene ral is the invcstigating arm of the

4

eel.
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acquisition or control ofgoods or provision ofservices, which causes or is likely to
cause an appreciable adverse effict on competition within India. "

Under Indian competition law, the concept of an "agreement" for the purposes
of section 3 includes "any arrangement or understanding or action in concert,(i) whether or not, such arrangement, understanding or action is formal or in
writing; or (ii) whether or not such arrangement, understanding or action is
intended ro be enforceable by legal proceedings.'"
In the absence of the CCI asserting direct proof of an agreement ro raise prices
or limit output, it appears that the CCI bases its finding on what it considers
ro be (indirect) evidence of an "action in concert. " The nature and quality of
the evidence relied on by the CCI ro suppOrt that finding will be examined
in detail in the remainder of this work. It is convenient ro note at the outset,
and ro frame the discussion which follows, that the evidence may be grouped
around the following broad categories' :
1.

price parallelism among the Opposite Parties involved in the case;

2.

price increases after the meetings of the CMA;

3.

low levels of capacity utilisation and reduced production;

4.

dispatch parallelism (i.e., alleged reduced capacity utilisation and reduction
in output not linked ro market forces);

5.

super-normal profits earned by the Opposite Parties;

G.

exchange of information relating ro prices, capacities and production '

Calculation of Penalty
The CCI considers that since the cement companies were found ro be involved
in a cartel, determination of the penalty is ro be made on the basis of section

7

s. 2(b), COMPETITION ACT 2002.

8

At paragraph 6.5.51 [he Order states [hat the findings of the DG may be grouped around
the first five parameters.

9

This clement is central to the CCl's reasoning, although was not specifically categorised
in the Order as a grouping identified by the DG. The CCI heavily cites information
exchange as a facilitating factor.

5
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27 (b) of the Competition Act. Where the CCI finds that an enterprise has been
involved in a violation of section 3, as here, the CCI may impose a penalty
amounting to the higher of ten per cent of turnover or three times profit.
Specifically, the C CI may:
" .. . impose such penalty, as it may deem fit which shall be not more than
ten per cent of the average of the turnover for the last three preceding
financial years, upon each of such person or enterprises which are parties to
such agreements or abuse:
Provided that in case any agreement referred to in section 3 has been entered
into by a cartel, the Commission may impose upon ead , producer, seller,
distributor, trader or service provider included in that cartel a penalty of up to
three times of its profit for each year of the continuance of such agreement
or ten per cent of its turnover for each year of the continuance of such
agreement, whichever is higher" (emphasis added). '·
The CCI makes the following determinations as ro the level of penalty:
In respect of the 11 cement manufacturers named as an O pposite Party, the
CCI finds that the amount of the penalty based on three times profits would
be higher than ten per cent of turnover. Taking account of the "totality of facts"
as fou nd by the CCI, it decides to impose a penalty of 0 .'; times net profits
for 2009-10 and 2010-11. There is no explanation in the Order of the CCI's
methodology in terms of the measure of profits it adopts or why it selected 0.5
as the relevant multiplier.
In the case of the CMA which the CCI considers has provided a "platform" for
the alleged cartelisation, the CCI decides to impose a penalty of ten per cent of
its total receipts for the relevant two years of the alleged in fringement. There
is no explanation of the CCl's methodology or the facrors it took into account
in selecting ten per cent (the upper boundary permitted by Indian law where
penalties are calculated on the basis of revenues) as the relevant multiplier.
l OS. 27(b) COMPETITION A CT, 2002.

6
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Since the enforcemem of the relevam provisions of the Competition Act only
came imo effect from 20 May, 2009, the CCl imposed penalties only for the
period commencing on that date (i.e., post-dating implememation of the
Competition Act) to the period up to which the Director General investigated.

FRAMEWORK FORAN INfERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Similar Legal Frameworks and Approach to Anti-Competitive Agreements
The main behavioural provisions of Indian competition law comained in
sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act are derived from, or at least modelled
on, Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) II ,
dealing with, respectively, ami-competitive agreemems and abuse of a dominant
position. This work focuses on section 3 as being the main provision that is
engaged in the Order.
A comparison between EU and Indian competition Jaw approaches to the
treatment of ami-competitive agreements and, specifically, cartels is particularly
lnstrUCtive.

Section 3 of the Competition Act provides that "[nlo enterprise or association
of enterprises or person or association of persons shall enter into any agreement
in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of
goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable
adverse effect on competition within India."
Similarly, Article 101 TFEU prohibits "all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market."

II

Formerly Articles 81 and 82, and 85 and 86 EC.

7
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In both Indian and EU competition law, a violation of the prohibition on anticompetitive agreements can be established in the absence of a formal agreement
between independent enterprises! 2 to restrict competition.
Under Indian competition law, the concept of an "agreement" includes "any
arrangement or understanding or action in concert-(i) whether or not, such
arrangement, understanding or action is formal or in writing; or (ii) whether
or not such arrangement, understanding or action is intended to be enforceable
by legal ptoceedings."!3
Under EU competition law, conduct may amount to a "concerted practice,"
even where the parties have not explicitly adhered to a common plan defining
their action in the market but knowingly adopt collusive actions which facilitate
the co-ordination of their commercial behaviour.!4
The categorisation of a case as falling within the principle of an "agreement"
or "action in concert" (the term used in Indian competition law) or "concerted
practice" (the term used in EU competition law) has implications fo r the quality
of evidence used to establish the necessary collusion. I shall return to this issue
when considering the use of indirect evidence.
The Nature Of The Presumption Of An "Appreciable Adverse Effect On
Competition"

The treatment of agreements (and actions in concert) under the Competition
Act differs depending on whether horizontal arrange me ts (i.e., between
enterprises or persons operating at the same level in the supply chain) or vertical
arrangements (i.e., between enterprises or persons operating at different levels
in the supply chain) are concerned. To restate this position:

12

In this work, the term "enterprises" is used to refer co independent economic agents . The
term "undertakings" is more familiar in the EU.

13

Supra Note 7.

14

Case T-7 /89, Hercules v. Commission. [1991 J ECR II-l7l!, paragraph 256.
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Horizontal arrangements, relating to price fixing, limitations on producrion
or supply, marker sharing and bid rigging, are presumed ro have an appreciable
adverse effect (AAE) under section 3(3) of the Competirion Act.
Vertical agreements, such as rhose berween a supplier and a distriburor, will
be subjecr ro a rule of reason-rype analysis . Secrion 3(4) provides rhat vertical
agreements (specifically including resale price maintenance, exclusive supply
or distribution agreements, tie-in arrangements or refusal ro deal) , will be
considered agreements contained within the prohibition of anti-competitive
agreements under section 3(1) if that agreement causes, or is likely ro cause,
an AAE on competition within the relevant markets in India.
In the case of a cartel, therefore, once an agreement or action in concert within
the meaning of section 3(1) is proven , there is presumed ro be an AAE. This
has a number of implications:
First, the application of the presumption of an AAE does not relieve the CCI of
the obligation ro prove an agreement or action in concert within the meaning
of section 3(1) in the first place.
Second, once an agreement or action in concert within the meaning of section
3(1) is proven ro the requisite legal standard, this gives rise ro a shift in the
burden of proof ro the enterprises ro rebut the presumption of an AAE.
Under EU competition law, ro prove the existence of a concerted practice the
European Commission must demonstrate the alleged (tacit) collusive action
berween the enterprises concerned. Insofar as price fixing is concerned, once the
concerted practice is proven, it is caught by Article 101 (I) TFEU even in the
absence of evidence of anti-competitive effects on the market. 15 Nonetheless,
this leaves open the possibiliry for enterprises ro establish that their arrangements
benefit from exemption within the meaning of Article 101(3) TFEU. 16
15
16

Case C-199 /92 P, HIs v. Commission, 11999J EC R 1-4287, paragraphs 158- 166.
Recognising (hat the relevant requirements under Article 101(3) TFEU will tend

difficult

to

to

be

satisfy in the case of price fixing, market sharing, bid rigging or other cartel-

like conduct.

9

Still. it remains the case that the European Commission must prove not only
a concerted practice. but also conduct resulring on the market havin g a casual
connection wirh ir. such thar rhe enterprises took account of each others' actions
(for example. information exchanged between competito rs) in determ ining
their own conduct on rhe market culminaring. effectively. in the adoption of
an overall plan ro regulate the market.
The Administrative Nature of Cartel Proceedings
As is the position under Indian competition law. cartel proceedings
conducred by the European Co mmission under EU competitio n law are
directed at enterprises. not at individuals. Accordingly. the investiga tive
measures are direcred at enrerprises. The sanctio ns are also admi nistrative
in nature (i. e .• civil penalties and orders ro cease or amend commercial
practices). There are no criminal sancrions ar EU level fo r violation of EU
con1petiti on law. 17

Given this similarity in the enforcement environment between India and EU. it
is particularly relevant to compare the posirion in the EU as regards the nature
and standard of proof in cartel cases.
Despite the adm inistrative character of EU competition law proceedings.
this does not significantly reduce the standard of proof upon the European
Commission in comparison to criminal proceedings found in common law
jurisdictions.
The CCI in its Order does nor articulate the requisite standard of proof that
ir is required to meet. In the absence of any direct precedents in India dealing
with a specific point. it is also reasonable to expect that experience in the EU/
UK will be instructive.
Under EU competition law. the European Commission pursuant to the relevant
adm inistrarive procedure "must produce sufficiently precise and consisrent
17

Criminal sanctions for violation of competition law exist in some Member States of the
EU. including the UK.
10
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evidence to suppOrt the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took
place."l.
Moreover, any doubt in the European Commission's evidence to prove an
infringement ofEU competition law must be resolved in favour of the enterprise
concerned. l' The implication of this for a review of the Order is important:
even in a system like the EU which also has an administrative procedure, the
standard of proof in cartel cases is a stringent one, with doubts being resolved
in favour of the enterprises under investigation.
International Best Practice

The CCI supportS its analysis In the Order by referring to international
competition regimes and cases where indirect or circumstantial evidence has
been used to prove a cartel infringement.
However, the CCI uses such examples selectively and without a full discussion
of the context in which such evidence was deployed and their relevance to
determination of the instant case.
First, the CCI cites cases in Brazil, Canada and Latvia as examples of
cases where "circumstantial evidence has been used."20 However, it does not
explain further how the circumstantial evidence was used in those cases,
whether it was determinative or why the facts and procedures in those
cases are pertinent to the Indi an competition law regime and the cement
case before it.
A notable omission is the failure to address the EU case law and procedural
context, as outlined here, as being arguably a more directly relevant comparator.

18

Joined Cases T·67/00, T·68/00, T·7I100 and T·78/00, JFE Engineering and Others v.
Commission, [2004 ] ECR [j·2501 ("JFE Engineering and Others v. Commission"),
paragraph I 79.
19 Ibid., paragraph 177.
20 Order, paragraph 6.5.9.
11
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Second, the CCI refers to the OECD's recent paper" on the use of indirect
evidence in cartel cases commenting that it is:
" .. . noteworthy that OECD in its paper ' Ptosecuting Cartels without Direct
Evidence of Agreement' (February 2006) has held as under ;
'Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence, for it is the
general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence .. .... in order to prove the conspiracy, it is not necessary fo r the
government to present proof of verbal or written agreement.'''''
Without more explanation, this statement is at least incomplete or po tentially
misleading on the nature of the OECD's findings in its paper," which covered
a review of the practices and procedures in around 20 jurisdictions.
Several key themes emerge from the OECD's summary of its findings . A
full extract of the OECD's findings in its executive summary is provided as
Annex I to this work. These findings have important implications for the use
of circumstantial! indirect evidence in a cartel case and, in India in particular,
as a newer competItIon regime.
Consolidating the findings by the OECD, the following Issues stand out
in terms of the evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of using indirect
evidence to establish the existence and/or effect of a cartel and which have most
relevance to assessment of the Order.
Competition authorities around the world may need to rely on indirect evidence

21

The OECD Global Forum on Competition debated prosecuting cartels with out evidence
of agreement in February 2006. It produced an executive summ ary and documents from
the meeting including an analytical nme by Mr. John Clark for the OEC D, written

submissions from AJgeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
the European Commission, France, Jamaica . Japan, Korea, Lith uania, Romania, the

Russian Federation, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei. Turkey, the Unitcd States, Zambia, and
BrAe, as well as an aide-memoire of the discussion.

22

Order, paragraph 6.5.9.

23

'Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement,' OEeD February 2006,
Executive Summary.
12
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prove the existence or effect of a cartel, but such evidence must be evaluated
carefully because it can be ambiguous where there is no direct evidence as in
the case of the Order.24
to

The better practice is to use circumstantial evidence holistically, taking account
of its cumulative effect in combination with other evidence.'s
Circumstantial evidence such as information exchange - which is relied on
heavily by the CCI in the Order - is probably not sufficient of itself to prove
the existence of a carteL'6
Of the two types of circumstantial evidence (communication evidence and
economic evidence) communication evidence (e.g., records of meetings,
telephone exchanges, and travel to a common destination) is the mote
persuasive. 27
Economic evidence (e.g., market structure and dynamics, price movements) is
almost always ambiguous. It must be interpreted with special care so as to be
consistent with other evidence."
In the majority of competition law regimes, carrels are prosecuted
administratively, as in India. In cases where there has been judicial review
of carrel cases, courts have been sceptical of cases founded on circumstantial
evidence alone. COMPAT should be similarly cautious in its review."
A competition authority should endeavour to build good cartel cases supported
by strong evidence and demonstrating the benefits to consumers.'o

25

Ibid., Executive Summary, paragraph 1
Ibid., paragraph 2.

26

Ibid., Executive Summary. paragraph 3.

24

27

Ibid., Exeeutive Summary, paragraph 4.

28

Ibid., Executive Summary. paragraph 5.

29

Ibid., Executive Summary. paragraph 6.

30

Ibid., Executive Summary, paragraph 8.
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I shall rerum ro these themes below when discussing the CC l's use of indirect
evidence in the Order.
DUE PROCESS
Introduction

The issue of "due process" or protection of procedural rights of defence is at
the forefront of rhe debate aro und the rules concerning legal proof of cartel
infringements.
In the EU, concernS are often raised by academics, practitioners and even the
media with regard ro an alleged deficient level of protection of the rights of
defence of investigated enterprises. 3I A related trend is an argument that, in
view of the increase in the number of competition law proceedings and the
level of penalties, such proceedings should enjoy rhe higher level of p rocedural
guarantees as apply in criminal cases even where the proceedings are actually
or ostensibly administrative.
Against this background, this section examines the Order from the perspective
of due process issues. It comments comparatively on how such issues have
been addressed in the EU context. There are significant areas where the CCl's
approach may be reviewed in light of such issues .
Legal Certainty

The general principle of legal certainty, broadly defined, maintains that no
person should be convicted or punished except in respect of a pre-existing and
clear rule oflaw. This section draws on insights from the EU experience of the
application of the principle oflegal certainty."
31

See for example. A Scordamaglia. Cartel ProD] Imputation and Sanctioning in European
Competition Law: Rrconciling 1foCliv~ enforcemmt and rukquau prottction ofprocedural
guaranurr 7(1 ) THE COMPETITION LAw REvIEW 5-52(December 2010).

32

h is beyond the scope of this paper to expand the treatment to an exhaustive discussion
of the application of this principle in other jurisdictions. ahhough th e principle is well
established in ocher legal systems.

14
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One of the manifestations of this principle in EU law requires that legislation
must be "unequivocal and its application must be predictable for those subject to
it. "33 Such requirements of certainty and predictability must also be observed
with greater strictness in the case of rules which are liable ro result in financial
consequences. 34

Furthermore, in cases where a provision empowers the European Commission ro
act (for example, ro impose penalties), it is necessary that the EU administration
(i.e., the Council) "clearly specify the bounds a/the power conftrred.""
Such requirements relating ro the quality and predictability of EU law have
led ro a significant number of enterprises appealing European Commission
cartel decisions on the grounds of the alleged unpredictability of the approach
rowards imposition of penalties.
This situation has been obviated, ro some extent, by the publication of
successive iterations of guidelines by the European Commission on its approach
ro determination of the penalty in EU competition cases, culminating most
recently in its 2006 Fining Guidelines'"
However, criticism persiSts. A study covering the period 1998-2007 found that
penalties were appealed in approximately 90 per cent of European Commission
cartel decisions, approximately 60 per cent of which were appealed successfully
with an average reduction in the penalty of 19 per cent. 37 While the grounds for
the successful appeals differed, it remains the case that a significant proportion
of EU cartel decisions are appealed typically on the basis of the European
Commission's approach ro calculation of the penalty. Guidance on penalties can
mitigate the scope for appeal, but does not eliminate the scope for challenges,
33
34
35

Case 70 /83 , Kloppenburg, [1984J ECR 1-8935, paragraph 11.
Case 326 /85, Netherlands v. Commission, [1987J ECR 5091, paragraph 24.
Case 291/86, Central-Import Mnster, [1988] ECR 3679, paragraph 13.

36

Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(A) of
Regulation No. 1/ 2003 (2003 /C220102) ("2006 Fining Guidelines")
C. Veljanovski, European Cartel Proucutions and Fines 1998-2007 -A Statistical Analysis
SSRN 5 (2007)

37

15
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not least since parties may seek to challenge a decision on the basis that the
European Commission has improperly applied its guidance.
A number of key principles emerge from the EU experience.
First. the EU Court has taken the view that a ten per cent of ann ual group
turnover upper limit in the calculation of penalties for competition law
violations is reasonable in view of the interests at stake."
Second. EU principles of proportionality and equal treatmen t and the
transparency of European Commission decisions have been judged to contribute
to a reasonably predictable system for the imposition of fines. 3'
Third. existing guidelines on penalties offer relevant information that enables
enterprises to foresee to the requisite legal standards the ethodology a,nd
magnitude of fines for any given conduct'O However. this assumes that
the underlying decision must "show the Commission's reasoning clearly and
unequivocally. ""
Standing back from the EU experience. it is worth consideritlg what relevance
that may have when considering the approach that COMPAT may take when
assessing the Order from the perspective of legal certainty.
First. it is a fundamental requirement that the statement or reasons in a decision
having an adverse effect on a person must provide that person wi th sufficient
information and clarity to enable them to ascertain the basis for the decision
against them. in particular the allegations made. the nature of the interests to
be protected and the selection of the level of penalty imposed commensurate
with the alleged violation and the interest to be protected.

38

Case T-43 /02. Jungbunzlauerv. Commission, [20061 ECR II-34535 ("Jungbunzlauer 'J,
paragraph 81.

39

Ibid , paragraphs 87-88.
Ibid, paragraph 90.
Ibid., paragraph 91.

40

41
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Second, the principle oflegal certainty broadly defined, would require that a
provision of law must clearly define penalties having regard ro the legitimate
aim in question, in order to give the persons concerned adequate protection
against arbitrary interference. Apart from the three times profits or ten per
cent of turnover statutory limits that circumscribe the eel's powers in the case
of violations of section 3, at the time of the eel Order, there was no further
guidance on the relevant factors that should or are likely to underpin the
eel's determination of penalties. Given the range of circumstances which can
give rise to liability under section 3, the absence of more definitive guidance
under Indian competition law both as a matter of general policy and in the
decisions of the eel raises doubts as to whether Indian law provides a suitably
predictable system for the imposition of penalties in actual cases. This does not
mean that guidelines would need to be exhaustive. Moreover, an authority in
the earlier stages of adoption of competition law may want to wait a period
of time to allow the relevant principles to emerge in case experience, and even
judicial review experience, before it crystallises such principles in gu idelines.
Nevertheless, this issue should not prevent the authority from setting out
the principles that would guide its review, even if only broad principles ca n
be defined at the outset, subject to further refinements when more practical
experience has been gained. Such considerations do not of course detract from
the requirement ro state adequate reasons in the underlying decision. I shall
return to the importance of the duty to state adequate reasons.
Third, the absence of a circumscribed system of penalties or statement of
adequate reasons in actual decisions, resulting in enterprises being unable to
determine with sufficient clari ty the boundaries according to which penalties
may be or have been imposed, undermines the legality of penalties imposed
in particular cases. In the absence of a well-reasoned decision, the reviewing
authority may be unable to adjudicate on a penalty consistent with the principle
that penalties must take account of the particular circumstances of the case. The
inexorable consequence may be that the penalty must be vacated completely by
the appellate tribunal, or at least substantially reduced in those cases decided
without adequate reasons and before guidelines are published.
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The Principle of Equal Treatment
The principle of equal treatment entails that like cases should be treared in like
manner. It follows from this that, conversely, different cases should be treated
differently according to their specific facts and circumstances.
In EU competition cases, the EU Court has discussed the principle of equal
treatment in administrative proceedings, leading to the imposition of penalties
as follows:

"As regards appraisal of the cooperation by the undertakings during an
administrative procedure initiated in relation to a prohibited agreement, the
Commission is not entitled to disregard the principle of equal treatment,
a general principle of Communicy law which, according to settled case-law,
is infringed only where comparable situations are treated differently or
different situations are treated in the same way, unless such difference of
treatment is objectively justified" (emphasis added) '2
The European Commission must provide evidence that is both "precise and
consistent. "43 The requirement of "consistency" must apply across the body of
evidence on which the authoricy relies and across all defenda.nts against whom
that evidence is relied upon.
On this basis, evidence does not satisfy the requirement of consistency if it is
regarded as insufficient to prove an infringement against certain defendants
but not against others in the same or similar situations.
The Order suffers from a number of concerns in relation
of equal treatment or consistency.

to

the requirement

The Order notes that as regards available capacicy:
42

Joined Cases T-45 / 98 and T /47 / 98 , KruppThyss en Sta nless Gm bH and
AcciaispecialiTerniSpA v. Commission of the European Communities (200 1] EeR 113757, summary paragraph 14.

43

Case T-36/05, Coats Holdings Ltd and )&P Coats Ltd v. Commi" ion of the European
Communities [2007] ECR II-IIO, paragra ph 71.
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" ... data ofCMA for the year 2010 reveals that there were 47 cement companies
having 142 plants and installed capacity of 97% of total capacity. fu has been
discussed in the preceding paras, 12 cement companies are having about 75% of
total ptoduction capacity in India. Further, DG has reported that 21 companies
control about 90% of the market share in terms of capacity.""
Despite reporting the finding by the Director General that forty seven cement
companies account for ninety seven per cent of capacity, the CCI has imposed
liability upon only eleven cement manufacturers and the CMA. The CCl's
reasoning for retaining what it considers to be sufficient evidence against certain
companies, but not agai nst others, is vague and risks being inco nsistent without
further explanation.
The Order observes that:
" ".the Opposite Parties have In their arguments along with other points
also contended that the report of the DG does not specify the names of the
co ntravening parties and also the period of alleged cartel. In this regard, the
Commission observes that the Opposite Parties mentioned in this case are the
prominent players in the market in respective regions and are the key players
in the whole arrangement. The other cement companies have followed them.
Moreover, the present inquiry is limited to the Opposite Parties named in the
information. "4 5

On the one hand, the CCI asserts that the Opposite Parties are the "prominent
players in the market in respective regions and are the key players in the whole
arrangement. "46 On the other hand, it appears to consider that other parties
were involved or implicated in the allegedly infringing activity, noting that those
"other cement companies have followed them. "47 Nowhere in the Order does the
CCI outline why it did not bring cases against those other parties other than
44

Order, paragraph 6.5.45.

45
46

Order, paragraph 6.11.
Order, paragraph 6.11.
Order, paragraph 6. 11.

47
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this reference to relative size. One interpretation is that it did not consider
that it had sufficient evidence to bring a case against those other parries, but
it is not apparent from the Order why the evidence that the CCI relies on in
relation to the Opposite Parries meets the requirement oflegal sufficiency for
those parries but was not sufficient to bring a case against others. W hile there
is no requirement to pursue an infringement case against all parries who are
implicated in a carrel, the CCI has not explained why it has apparently rejected
evidence against certain parries while regarding such evidence as sufficient to
found a case against the Opposite Parties.
Furthermore, the CCI has imposed the same proportionate penalty (i.e.,
a m ultiple of 0 .5 times profits) on each of the eleven cement companies
where it finds liability, without any apparent assessment of the nature of the
relative involvement of those parties in the alleged infringement and how that
determination might impact on the level of penalties. It does not consider
whether any particular enterprise may have had a more significant role than
another or been involved for a greater or lesser durarion.
In rejecting evidence as insufficient against some parties but nor others and
applying a blanket approach to the determination of the level of penalty and
the duration of the infringement in relation to each addressee of the O rder, the
CCl's approach raises questions regarding the principle of equal treatmenr. I
return to these issues when discussing penalties below.

USE OF INDIRECT EVIDENCE
The Use of Indirect Evidence in Cartel Investigations
It is incontrovertible that competition authorities around the world use both
direct and indirect evidence to prove an infringement. See Annex I for a
summaty of the OECD's findin gs in its roundtable debating the use of indirect
evidence in international cartel proceedings.
In order to examine the evidence relied upon in the Order t support a finding
of infringement under India competition law, this section inspects the use of
20
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indirect evidence from the viewpoint of EU law. It analyses the circumstances
when indirect evidence can be used ro support a finding of infringement based
on a "concerted practice." The EU is chosen as an illustrative benchmark
compararor because of its closeness to Indian competition law in terms of the
substantive and procedural laws relevant to cartel cases as discussed in later.
This section also draws upon insights from the OECD in its 2008 roundtable
as a broad benchmark for comparison of the approaches that competition
authorities around the world have taken to the use of indirect evidence in
cartel investigations."
The main implications for this section are the following: indirect evidence
generally derives its power when used with other evidence of infringement, so
that a consistent "pattern of guilt" emerges. The naked use of indirect evidence
alone and, particularly, economic evidence does not currently support findings
of infringement which have stood up to judicial scrutiny in the EU. These
findings mean that COM PAT under a similar legal and procedural framework
should be slow to find evidence of a cartel based on indirect evidence alone,
unless it finds that evidence to be highly compelling and where there is no
reasonable alternative explanation.
EU Experience of the Use of Indirect Evidence io Cartel Investigations

The European Commission can rely on both direct and indirect evidence for
the purposes of proving an infringement of EU competition law.
While the dividing line between direct and indirect evidence may be loose
in some instances, a working distinction can be drawn for the purposes of
analysis here.
Direct Evidence is of the highest probative value where it enables the European
Commission to find that the enterprises concluded an agreement, the object
or effect of which was to prevent, restrict or distort competition. Such direct
evidence may comprise so-called "smoking guns," such as contemporaneous
48

Supra note 23.
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documents or memoranda, gentlemen's agreements, meeting notes, minutes,

budget entries or emails relating to monitoring systems. Corporate statements
ftom the enterprises involved in allegedly infringing activity, which are obtained
in the course of a leniency application, may also provide direct evidence of
participation. Such statements need to be viewed in context, in particular taking
account of the interests of the person making the statement and whether it is
corroborated by other evidence and participants.
Indirect or Circumstantial Evidence comprises evidence "which is appropriate
to co rroborate the proof or existence of a ca rtel by way of deduction,
common sense, economic analysis or logical inference from other facts which
are demonstrated ."49 Such evidence may include parallel price increases of
companies suspected of participating in a cartel or economic evidence such as a
situation of high market concentration and homogeneous products facilitating
price coordination.
A number of key principles emerge from the EU cases:
First, infringement can be based on indirect evidence if an overall pattern of guilt
emerges and which is corroborated by the actual conduct of the undertakings on
the market. In Suiker Unie'° the EU Court set down the conditions which need to
be satisfied to prove a "concerted practice." The EU Court commented as follows:
"The criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law of
the Co urt, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must
be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the
Treaty relating to competition that each economic operat r must determine
independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market,
including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he makes,
offers or sells.

49 Ibid.• page 11 6.
50 Joined cases 40

to 48. 50. 54 to 56. 111 , 113 and 114-73. COiiperatieveVereniging
"SuikerUn ie" UA and others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1975J EeR
1663 ("S uikerUn ie").
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Although it is correct to say that this requirement of independence does not
deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the
existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does, however, strictly
preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or
effect of which is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or
potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct
which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate on the market.
The documents quoted show that the applicants contacted each other and that
they, in fact, pursued the aim of removing in advance any uncertainty as to
the future conduct of their competitors" (emphasis added).'l
Consolidating the principles outlined by the EU Courr, in order to suppOrt a
finding of a concerted practice there must be: (a) coordination or cooperation
between independent enterprises; (b) coordination or cooperation established
as a result of direct or indirect contact; (c) coordination or cooperation aimed
to remove uncertainties related to the future conduct of competito rs.
Second, indirect evidence must be seen in context and in conjunction with all
the other direct and indirect evidence. The EU Court has stated that "items of
evidence should be regarded not in isolation but in their entirety
and individual
items ofevidence cannot be divorced from their context. "S2

r ..]

Third, mere parallelism is insufficient to ptove an infringement. In Dyestuffi,53
the EU Court observed that:
" ... [allthough parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a
concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a
practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the

51 Ibid., paragraphs 173-175.
52 Joined easesT-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94 , T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-31B/94, T-325/94,
T-32B/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and o[hers v.
Commission 11999J ECR 11-931.
53 Case 48 /69 , Imp eria l Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commiss ion of [he Europea n
Communi[ies 11972J ECR 619 ("Dyestuffs).
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normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products,
the size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market"
(emphasis added). "
Fourth, the longstanding experience of the European Commi ssion demonstrates
that it tends to be very difficult to suppOrt a decision imposing penalties relying
exclusively or to a large extent on economic evidence. The only case which
relied exclusively on indirect evidence in the form of economic studies was
annulled by the EU Court. 55
Fifth, cases involving information exchange raise special and often difficult
considerations. The Eu ropean Commission has summarised the evolving case
law and its approach to the competition issues arising in relation to information
exchange berween competitors in its Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines.'6
A d istinction should be drawn berween: (a) exchange of information ro monitor
a cartel , which is always unlawful; and (b) "pure information exchange, "
which can be lawful depending on the facts. Information exchange berween
competitors can present risks under competition law:
where the information is not public (or not public in the form that it is accessed)
and is commercially sensitive (i.e., it relates to price, costs, capaciry, production
levels, market shares, details of terms and conditions offered to cuStomers and
other commercially sensitive information). The European Commission states
that "[w}here a company makes a unilateral announcement that is also genuinely

54

Ibid. , paragraph 66.

55

Joined Cases C-89/85 and others. Wood Pulp. [1993] ECR 1307. This case was decided
by the European Commission in 1984 and asserted that it was not possibl e [0 explain the
price increases with conscious parallelism as may be observed in oligo polistic markets.
The Wood pulp manufacturers applied lO th e EU Court [0 challenge the European
Commission's decision. The EU Court ruled that, contrary to the decision of [he European
Commission, the market had become transparent fo r innocuous and natural market
structure related reasons and that the parallel price movements could be explained by
normal oligopol isric interdependence.

S6

Guidelines on the applicabiliry of Article 101 of the Treary on the Functioning of the
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (20II /e 1 I/OI ) (" Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines").
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public, for example through a newspaper, this generally does not constitute a concerted
practice within the meaning ofArticle 101(1)"" ;
the more recent the information. Exchanges of historic information are less
likely to be ptoblematic. The Eutopean Commission states that "[t}he exchange
of historic data is unlikely to lead to a collusive outcome, as it is unlikely to be
indicative ofthe competitors'foture conduct or to provide a common understanding
on the market. Moreover, exchanging historic data is unlikely to foci/itate monitoring
ofdeviations because the older the data, the less usefol it would befor timely detection
ofdeviations and, thus, as a credible threat ofprompt retaliation"" ;
the more individualised the information (i .e., where it is possible to attribute
the information to individual companies) . The European Commission states
that "(e}xchanges ofgenuinely aggregated data, that is to sa)! where the recognition
ofindividualised company level information is sufficiently difficult, are much less
likely to lead to restrictive effiets on competition than exchanges ofcompany level
data. "59
Finally, previous experience has shown that where the European Commission
has sought to rely largely on indirect evidence, such evidence will not be
persuasive before the EU Court where the allegedly infringing parties can put
forward plausible (not anti-competitive) explanations that render unreliable
the finding of a cartel. The result is that the suspected undertakings "do not
necessarily have to go as for as to show that the Commission's assertions are wrong,
but merely have to show that they are unsaft or insufficiently proven. '60
Implications for Assessment of the Evidence Presented in the Order

Against the above discussion of the role of indirect evidence in cartel cases,
a number of observations may be made about the evidence relied on by the

57
58
59
60

Ibid., paragraph 63.
Ibid. , paragraph 90.
Ibid., paragraph 89.
Supra note 52, paragraph 519.
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CCI in the Order. These observations are intended to illustrate some of the
key themes emerging from the close to 300-page Order. This is far from an
exhaustive review of the evidence.
Findings Based Only on Indirect Evidence
The CCl bases its findings exclusively on indirect or circu stantial evidence.
There was no leniency applicant providing a statement of direct involvement
in or admission of the alleged cartel.
O f the two types of indirect evidence (communication evidence and economic
evidence), it will be recalled that the OECD notes that There are two general
types ofcircumstantial evidence: communication evidence and economic evidence.
Ofthe two, communication evidence is considered to be the more important"
(emphasis added) 6'
U

In the instant case, the Order reporrs meetings of rhe CMA , bur it contains no
detailed evidence of the substance or detail of such meetings to support that
there was a common plan ro fix prices or curtail production.
Evidence in Context
The CC l relies on evidence of an informant (the Buil ers Association of
India) and customers. Clearly, a degree of corroboration is requi red of this
evidence to determine its probative value, in view of the obvious interests of
the informant and customers. Among the factors that would be relevant to that
assessment, include (a) was the author a direct witness speaking from personal
knowledge of the facts (e.g., attendance at meetings of the CMA or the High
Power Committee of its members); (b) were the statements made after mature
reHection; (c) were the "atements supplemented throughout the proceedings;
(d) to what extent did the CCl verify or cross-examine the author; and (e)
to what extent did the Opposite Parties have an opportunity to challenge

61

Supra note 23.
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the evidence in the administrative procedure. 6' The CCI does not detail its
consideration of such factors in the Order.
Price Parallelism
The CCI relies extensively on price parallelism to support its findings. It will be
recalled that price parallelism, of itself. is not sufficient to found an infringement
in most competition law jurisdictions as surveyed by the OECD and must be
carefully exami ned.
fu the OECD notes, "the evidence should be inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the market participants are acting unilaterally in their self interest. "63 In
this regard, the Order cites that a representative of India Cement made the
observation that:
" ... [aJs regards curtailment of production due to pnces, the same depends
upon short term and long term business strategy, need to protect market share
at any cost, etc. It is not always that we cut production, whenever prices were
dropped. Decision is taken based on prevailing situation at that point in time."64
Commenting on this statement, the CCI "observes that statements of
representatives of cement companies also confirm that they resort to curtailment
of supplies and production in order to get better prices from the market and
protect market share. "65 Even if such an assertion could be substantiated, this
is not evidence that the cement manufacturers colluded to curtail production.
Economic Evidence
The CCI places considerable reliance on economic evidence. This is disputed
by virtually all the Opposite Parties in their submissions.

62

Certain Opposite Panics deny that they had the opportunity
informant.

63
64

Supra note 61
Q,dcr, pa<ag,aph 6.9.12.

65

Q,der, paragraph 6.9.12.
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As the OECD has noted, "Economic evidence is almost always ambiguous.
It could be consistent with either agreement or independent action. Therefore
it requires careful analysis."66
As noted above, the CCI relies particularly on price parallelism, no ting that
"economic analysis of the data confirms rhat rhe coefficient of cortelation of
change in prices or the movement of prices of all the companies is positive
and are very close to each orher (more than 0.5%) giving a strong indication
of price parallelism."67
H owever, the selection of the 0.5 per cent coefficient and the economic
assessment by the CCI is disputed by every Opposite Parry and most have put
forward alternative economics reports.
Information Exchange

It appears ftom the Order that information exchange was central to the CCl's
decision. Citing the Director General's report the CCI notes that:
" ... although the Opposite Parties and CMA have denied that the prices and
ptoduction related issues are not discussed/exchanged or covered under the
activities ofCMA, there exists a system of exchange of price information among
the members of CMA on weekly basis across rhe country."68
The CCI repeatedly refers to information exchange as a facilitating factor in
the alleged collusion. For example:
"The Commission observes that the aforesaid establishes that the cement
companies are interacting at the platform of CMA, sharing information
about cost, prices, production and capacities. Such discussions facilitate
interactions among the members for determination and fixation of both prices
. and production" (emphasis added).6'
66

Supra note 61,

6?
68
69

Order, paragraph 4.2.25.
Order, paragraph 4.2.44.
Order, paragraph 6.5.34.
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However, a closer examination of the evidence of information exchange relied
on by the CCI suggests that the information exchanged and the manner of its
exchange was not of a type that would typically raise competition concerns - at
least by EU standards.
The reliance on blind newspaper records 70 o r historic information" or
aggregated information 72 or averaged information 7 ' would not typically
provide a mechanism for coordination of future pricing or output, since such
information would not generally be considered to reduce uncertainty about
the future conduct of competitors.
In particular, the circulation of non-individualised pricing information would
not typically raise competition concerns. Opposite Party No. 6 notes that "data
collected by CMA is not company specific, and CMA also does not maintain any
records ofthe same. "74

Insofar as the information exchanged was historic, aggregated by CMA and
communicated in a non-company specific manner, the conclusion that such
information exchange was used to facilitate a cartel is seriously undermined.
Alternative Explanations

Finally, the Opposite Parties have put forward alternative explanations for the
apparent price and capacity movements. A few examples will serve to illustrate
possible alternative and non-collusive explanations.
In relation to capacity utilisation , Opposite Party No.2 notes "the availability of
railway rakes, shortage of key inputs, labour shortages, power blackouts, political
stability in a particular State, availability of trucks, late arrival of inputs, etc.""
70
71
72
73
74
75

Order, paragraph
Order, paragraph
Order, paragraph
Order, paragraph
Order, paragraph
Order, paragraph

2.13.24.
5.1.7, 5.1.11 , 5.4.16, 5.8.4.
5.4.17.
5.1.14.
5.5.30.
5.2.9.
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Opposite Party No.4 states mat " [r] he apparent reduction in capacity utilization
is attributable to large extent of new manufacturing capacity added which takes
anything from 1 to 3 years to attain optimal production levels ."' 6 It further
states that "[aJpart ftom the demand and supply, various other facts including
cost of production, seasonality of demand, variation in demand due to various
factors, e.g., weamer condition, local government spending, agriculture crops
logistics (availability of trucks and railway rakes), taxes, etc. , etermine the price
of cement. Whenever me cost increases, depending upon demand scenario,
the cost increase is passed on to customers and if demand is weak, the cost is
absorbed by manufacturer and recovered later when demand picks up depending
upon the prevailing market prices at that time.""
Opposite Party No. 6 maintains that non-collusive factors explain any apparent
reductions in capacity. It has argued that "there are certain factors which have
been hindering the full utilization of the cements plants, s ch as, availability
of the key raw materials, erratic power supply, break down of machinery
or stoppage of plants for upgradation, high inventory of clinker, logistic
constraints, demand growth and labour disturbance."78
While me strength of such explanations will nOt be debated here and will no
doubt be examined in detail by COMPAT, a brief review of the alternative
explanations put forward by the Opposite Parties at least suggests a need for
further examination as to whether me inference of a cartel would be a safe or
a sufficiently proven conclusion in the face of such alternative explanations .
Such explanations must, of course, be set aside the statements put form by the
CCI that "mere is always an opportunity of discussing me determination and
fixation of prices for furure"" or "mere are clear possibilitie ' and opportunities
for coordination on prices"'o or "[wJhen the competing cement companies are
76
77

Order, paragraph 5.4.5.
0 rder, paragraph 5.4. 2 l.

78

Order, paragraph 6.7.4.

79
80

Order, paragraph 6.5.19.
Order, paragraph 6.5.37.
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collecting prices from different centres of the country of each other, there are
enough occasions for collusion among them on the matters of price" (emphasis
added)." However, it is clear that "opportunity", "possibility" and "occasion"
for collusion do not amount to strong, precise and incontrovertible evidence
of actual collusion.
The CCI further maintains that" there is no efficiency deftnce brought in
Opposite Parties, as mentioned in section 19(3)(e) and (f) o/the Act."" This is
hardly surprising. It is the contention of the Opposite Parties that they are not
involved in any coordinated action at all- not that such action may be justified
because it gives rise to "improvements in production or distribution of goods
or provision of services" or "promotion of technical, scientific and economic
development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of
services" within the meaning of section 19(3) of the Competition Act.
Conclusion on Use of Indirect Evidence in The Order
The CCI asserts that "while the capaciry utilization has been increased
continuously during the last 4 years, the ptoduction has not been increased
commensurately during this period, which seems to suggest there is an
understanding among the cement companies to keep the production lower
than the demand in order to create artificial scarcity for the purpose of charging
higher profit" (emphasis added) "
In conclusion and returning to the theme outlined at the beginning of this
section, indirect evidence must be viewed in its totality. It must be asked
whether, holistically, the CCI has adduced "sufficiently precise and consistent
evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place. '.4

81
82
83

Order, paragraph 6.5.137
Order, paragraph 6.lD.8.
Order, paragraph 6.7.2.
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JFE Engineering and Others v. Commission , paragraph 179.
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THE PRINCIPLE OF A "SINGLE AND CONTINUOUS
INFRINGEMENT"
Introduction

The cement case may be categorised as a complex case, allegedly involving a
number of producers over a number of years and seeking ro regulate the market
between them. Here the EU experience is instructive in setting our the legal
requirements that need to be satisfied to prove what in EU terminology may
be described as a "single and continuous infringement" or "SCI. "

In particular, it remains essential for the European Commission

prove
participation for each individual party concerned in the alleged SCI. Consistent
with this principle, the EU Court has emphasised that:
to

" ... [wJ hen the Commission establishes that the undertaking in question has
participated in an anticompetitive measure, it is for that undertaking to provide,
usi ng not only the documents that were not disclosed, bur also [... J a different
explanation for its conduct" (emphasis added) .'s
These conditions have relevance for assessment of the instant case where it
is alleged that the 11 cement companies, through the CMA, conspired to fix
prices and capacity levels. However, unless there are found to be sufficient links
between the various elements of the alleged cartel, it would not be possible to
demonstrate a single overall plan comprising all elements and , therefore, no
SCI around the ex istence of a centrally organised core at the centre of a large
number of more diverse bilateral and multilateral contacts.
The Legal Principle of a Single and Continuous Infringement

The EU Court has addressed the limitations of the concept of SC I which
presupposes a complex of practices adopted by various parties in pursuit of a
single anti-competitive economic aim.
85

Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C205 /00 P, C-211 /00 P, C-213/00 P, C-21 7/00 P and C-219/00
P, Aalborg Portland NS and olhers v. Commission, [2004] EC R 1-123, paragraph 132.
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Overall Plan with a Single Objective
The EU Court has stated that where there are numerous bilateral and multilateral
contacts between a large number of parties, it cannot be presumed that they all
form part of a SCI, especially where such parties operate on different relevant
markets. The EU Cou rt has stated that:
" ... for the purposes of characterising various instances of conduct as a single
and continuous infringement, it is necessary ro establish whether they display
a link of complementarity, in that each of them is intended ro deal with one or
more consequences of the normal pattern of competition, and whether, through
interaction, they contribute ro the attainment of the set of anti-competitive
effects desired by those responsible, within the framework of a global plan
having a single objective."'6
It is also necessaty ro prove that the overall plan included all the constituent
elements of the cartel. It is not sufficient ro prove that an undertaking
participated in one element of the infringement (e.g., price coordination) for
it ro be held liable for other elements of the infringement (e.g., production
limitation); all the relevant elements of the infringement must be proven as
part of the overall plan.
Moreover, it is not sufficient ro prove that there is a general common objective
by reference to a general restriction or distortion of competition in the relevant
market. The EU Court has made clear that " the object of price distortion is
inherent in any price cartel and cannot, ofitself, prove the existence ofa common
subjective element.".,
liabiliry of a Single Enterprise for a SCI
Even where the legal requirements of a SCI are met, it is still necessary to
prove the individual responsibility of each relevant enterprise in order for it to
be held liable. According to the EU Court, the European Commission must:
86

Case T-446/05, Amman & Shne GmbH & Co. KG and Cousin Filrerie SAS v. European
Comm ission. [2010j ECR 00 (''Amman & Shne"), paragraph 92
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Ibid,paragraph 96.
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" ... demonstrate that each undertaking concerned either ,:onsented to the
adoption of an overall plan comprising the constitUent elements of the cartel,
or that it participated directly in all those elements during that period. An
undertaking may also be held responsible for an overall cartel even though it
is shown that it participated directly only in one or so me f the constituent
elements, if it is shown that it knew, or must have known, that the collusion
in which it participated was part of an overall plan and that the overall
plan included all the constituent elements of the cartel" (e mphasis added)"
Thus, the intention to contribute to the common objective of all the participants
and the awareness on the part of the enterprise concerned of the actUal infringing
activity of all the other participants need to be demonstrated.
Application of the Principle of a SCI to the Facts Presenl ed in the Order
It may be questioned whether the CCI has brought forward sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that:
there was a single overall plan encompassing all of the constituent elements
of the alleged infringement and that those elements were sufliciently li nked;
each Opposite Party participated in, or can be held responsib le for this overall
plan, because either: (i) it participated in all the elements; or (ii) it intended
by its conduct to contribute to the common objectives p rsued by all the
participants in the alleged infringement.
The fact pattern presented in the Order represents a series of assertions of
a general objective to restrict co mpetition. The CCI makes a nu mber of
statements in the Order to suppOrt its finding of infringement. Yet, these
tentative statements fall far short of the specificity as to amount to an overall
plan encompassing all the constitUent elements. A number of examples will
illustrate this point:

88

Case T-295 /94, Buchmann GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities. [1998]

ECR II 813, paragraph 121.
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" ... [r)he decisions relating to increase or decrease in dispatches are so close
that it is indicative of some kind of meeting of minds"{emphasis added)"
" ... the cement manufacturers are entering into some arrangements and
understanding to manipulate the price of cement" {emphasis added)'O
" ... OG has concluded that it is established that the Opposite Parties are
conttolling the supply of cement in the market byway of some tacit agreement"
(emphasis added)"
" ... condua of the market participants cannot be explained but for some sort of
anticompetitive agreement and action in conoert arnong them" {emphasis added)."
The CC I does not identifY a central agreement or meeting of minds, the type
of which has been identified to suppOrt a finding of a SCI- at least in the EU.
It then concludes that therefore "all the cement companies, even if they are not
the members of CMA, are the part ofthe whole arrangement. Even if there could
be difference in the cost structure of cement companies, the parallel behaviour in
movement of prices reflects some arrangement and understanding among
them " {emphasis added)."
The CCI does not apparently link every alleged infringing party to the alleged
infringement and actoss all the elements. A number of interesting facts emerge
relating to those parties who were alleged to participate and those which were
not so found.
The alleged infringement covers two separate elements: (i) coordination on
prices and capacity utilisation (subject matter); and (ii) across eleven separate
enterprises (parties). However, the CMA maintains that it has forty two
members. It is not clear why only eleven manufacturers are found to have
participated in the allegedly infringing activity.
89
90
91
92
93

Order, paragraph 4.2.35.
Order, paragraph 4.3.47.
Order, paragraph 4.3.
Order, paragraph 6.5.7.
Order, paragraph 6.10.4.
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Opposite Parry No.2 resigned from the CMA. yet is charged with infringement.
Opposite Parry No. 6 has no presence in the South. yet this region apparently accounts for 40 per cent ofIndian production"
Opposite Parry No. 1l is one of the eleven cement manufacmrers charged. yet
it was not even named in the Director General's report. It is not mentioned in
the table appearing at paragraph 6.3.7 of the Order which putportS to depict
the players with the largest market share. The CCI and the irector General
appear to place a considerable emphasis on the meetings of the High Power
Committee. However. Opposite Parry No. 11 maintains that it was nOt a
member of the High Power Committee and did not attend any of its meetings.
According to one Opposite Parry. the prices of the Cement Corporation ofIndia.
a public sector undertaking. also moved in line with the prices of all the other
named manufacturers. but it was not found to be part of the alleged cartel '5
The evidence on which the CCI relies arguably does not show that by
exchanging information each and every Opposite Parry was aware that they were
taking part in an overall anti-competitive plan or intended by their conduct
to contribute to such. T he single objective linking the var ious participants
and elements that are alleged in the Order cannot be so loosely described to
support a finding of a cartel that each parry knew that the alleged collusion it
participated in was "part ofan overall plan and that the overall plan included all
the constituent elements ofthe cartel. ..

CALCULATION OF PENALTY
Introduction

If an agreement is found to infringe the prohibition in section 3(1) of the
Competition Act it will be void. The CCI may impose fines of up to ten per
cent of the average turnover of the parties for the last three years. An enterprise

94
95

Order. paragraph 5.5.2.
Order. paragraph 5.4.28.
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found to have engaged in cartel activities may be fined the greater of three times
the profit or ten per cent of turnover for each year of the cartel.
In this case, the CCI imposed penalties amounting to 0.5 times profits (in the
case of the cement manufacturers) and ten per cent of receipts (in the case of
CMA) . It is unclear as to the CCl's reasoning for its selection of penalties at
this level and why it chose to impose the same multiplier in the case of all the
eleven cement manufacturers.
There is no guidance (whether in legislation or statements from the CCl) on the
factors that the CCI will take into account when determining the appropriate
level of penalty, other than that this must be commensurate with the violation .
In the EU, at the upper limit, the penalties that can be imposed for an
infringement of EU competition law can be up to ten per cent of worldwide
group turnover in the financial year preceding the decision. The European
Commission published its most recent Guidelines on setting fines in September
2006 % The European Commission takes into account the nature and gravity
of the infringement, the impact on the market, and the size of the relevant
geographic market. Next, the European Commission determines the duration of
the participation in the cartel activity and multiplies the value of the sales by the
number of years the company participated in the cartel. Even if an undertaking
only participates in the cartel for a short period, the European Commission
imposes a fine (referred to as an 'entty fee'9,) of fifteen per cent to twenty five
per cent of the value of sales in order to deter companies ftom participating
in a cartel. In the EU, once the European Commission determines the basic
amount based on sales, duration, and the 'entty fee,' it will assess whether to
increase or decrease the fine, based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
See, further, Annex II which summarises the European Commission's approach
to calculating penalties.
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2006 Fining Guidelines.
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See Annex II on entry fee deterrence.
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This section examines by way of comparative analysis the factors that would
be relevant to the determination of the penalty in a comparable EO case and
considers their relevance for the assessment of penalties i the Order. This
section is not an exhaustive review of what level of penalty would be apptopriate
in a comparable EO case but seeks, rather, to outline key methodological factors
which would typically affect such a determination.
Gravity of the Infringement
When calculating penalties the European Commission will take into account the
gravity (seriousness) of the infringement. The 2006 Fining Guidelines state that
"[t}he basic amount of the fine will be related to a proportion of the value ofsales,
depending on the degree ofgravity ofthe infringement, multiplied by the number of
years ofinfringement' and "{t}he assessment ofgravity will be made on a case-by-case
basis for all types ofinfringement, taking account ofall the relevant circumstances of
the case."98 It is of note that the assessment of gravity is taken into account before
considering any aggravating or mitigating factors, where relevant.
Market Share
In its 2006 Fining Guidelines, the European Commission sta[es that it will take
market share into account when determining the basic amount of the fine "
The Order finds that ',lS per the report ofDG, [the Opposite Parties} control about
75% market share of cement in India. "l()O However, the players mentioned in
one of the tables in the Order (at paragraph 6.3.7) are repon ed to account for
market shares ranging from 18.12 per cent to 3.22 per cent. Opposite party
No. II's market share is not included in that table, although it maintains that
it has an all India market share of only 2 per cent. IOI
This range in market shares of the Opposite Parties at the very least suggests that
an examination of their situations should be conducted to determine whether
they should be treated differently when determining liability and penalties.
98

2006 Fining Guidelines, paragraphs 19 and 20.
99 Ibid, paragraph 22.
100 Order, paragraph 6.3.7.
101 Order, paragraph 5.10.7.
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Aggravating Circumstances
The European Commission may increase the penalty to take account of
recidivism , refusal to cooperate in the investigation and the role of ring-leader!
coercer, where relevant. 102 The CCI in its Order has not apparently examined
nor has evidence of any such circumstances.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Relative Level of Involvement
The European Commission may reduce penalties to take account of the
level of involvement of the enterprise in the infringement, specifically "where
the undertaking provides evidence that its involvement in the infringement is
substantially limited and thus demonstrates that, during the period in which it
was party to the offinding agreement, it actually avoided applying it by adopting
competitive conduct in the market. "103
Furthermore, the EU Court has emphasised that the relative level of participation
of an enterprise in an infringement is a facror to be taken into account when
determining the gravity of the infringement (i.e., it is not only a mitigating
factor) . In Bolwri, the EU Court stated that the European Commission should:
" ... consider the relative gravity of the participation of each of them [i.e. ,
participating enterprises]' which implies in particular that the roles played by
each of them in the infringement for the duration of their participation in it
should be established" (emphasis added) l04
The Order raises tensions with regard to the principle of equal treatment in
two maIn ways .

102 2006 Fining Guidelines. paragraph 28.

103 Ibid, paragraph 29.
Joined Cases T- 109/02. T-118/02. T-122/02 . T- 125/02. T - 126/02 . T-128 /02. T-129 /02.
T-132 /02 and T-136/02. Bollon! SA and Others v. Commission oj the European
Communities. [20071 ECR 11-947. paragraph 56 1.
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First, it has treated different (cement manufactUrer) Opposite Parties in the same
way by applying (a) the same percentage multipliers to the level of penalty; and
(b) the same duration for participation of each in the alleged cartel, without
apparent reason or explanation.
Second, it has treated the position of other cement manufactUrers in the market
who were also members of the CMA or whose pricing moved at a similar level
to that of the Opposite Parties differently by concluding that , uch parties should
be excluded from the finding of infringement in the Order.
Nowhere in the Order does the CCI take into account any relative level of
involvement of the relevant Opposite Parties when determining the extent of
liability or level of penalty.

Role of Regulatory Regime
The European C ommission may reduce fines "where the anti-competitive
conduct of the undertaking has been authorized or encouraged by public
authorities or by legislation. "'·s
In its decision relating to the Bananas cartel, '06 the European Commission made
a reduction of 60 per cen t to take account of the relevant regulatory regime.
In this case it will be recalled that:
"DG found out that after the closure of the office of Development Commissioner
of Cement Industry (DCC!) in 1989, the Department ofindusuial policy and
Promotion , Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India had
directed the Cement Manufacturers' Association (CMA) to collect and submit
data which were earlier being collect (sic) by DCCI under th~ instructions from
DIPp, has been collecting retail and wholesale prices across the industry." '·?

105 2006 Fining Guidelines, paragraph 29. This is without prejudice

(0

action that may be

taken againS[ a Member Stale.

106 Commission Decision of 15 October 2008, Case COMP/39 188 ·· Bananas.
Order, paragraph 4.2.11.

107
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The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) directed the
CMA to gather information, presumably to allow the authoriry to monitor
cement prices and capaciry. Yet, by virtue of this directive, it may have created
"opportunities" for information exchange that might run counter to promoting
or at least preserving competition. It does not appear from the public disclosures
in the Order or elsewhere that DIPP took any active steps to seek to prevent the
relevant data being used outside the strict purview of the regulatory directive.
While it is accepted that in this case the regulatory regime did not mandate
that the price or output of the cement manufacturers should be coordinated, or
that the parties should exchange commercially sensitive information amongst
themselves, it may be argued that any penalties imposed should reRect the
regulatory environment pursuant to which a government authority had
instructed that industry data be collated. This is of course without prejudice
to the argument that the relevant information exchanged may not have been
competitively sensitive at all as discussed above.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Indian Competition Act, now a decade after its adoption, has had some
time to bed down, even though the actual period of its enforcement - in the
last three years - has been confined to a relatively short period. The Order is
arguably the most significant CCI decision to date in terms of the substantive
issues under consideration, the magnitude of the penalties involved and the
on-going substantive and procedural implications for determination of future
cases (under appeal to COMPAT and currently pending before the CCI) .
The CCI will understandably want ro choose its cases carefully to ensute that
(a) it sends out the right message in terms of enforcement policies and priorities;
and (b) they are robust to challenge before COMPAT.
Similarly, COMPAT when adjudicating upon appeals will desire (a) to subject
the CCI's's reasoning and approach to robust review lest it fail to meet its dury
to act as an effective judicial control and expose itself to suggestions of'tubber
stamping' the CCl's reasoning; and (b) to enSute that the CCl's decisions are
41
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not undermined to such extent that its ability to secure respect for its authority
is seriously compromised at this delicate and important juncture in its history.
The legal substantive law, guidance and the supporting procedural framework
are as important as the CCI's and COM PAT'S discretion and policy. Against
this background, this section concludes with so me key consideratio ns for (a)
COMPAT'S review of the Order; and (b) wider development of the competition
law enforcement regime in India.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXAMINATION OF THE CCI'S REASONING
IN THE ORDER
It is a sertled principle of natural justice that the starem nt of reasons in a
decision having an adverse effect on an enterprise must enable effective review
of that decision of its legal validity.
The EU Court has summed up the du ty ro state reaso ns

a., follows:

"In line with setded case-law, the statement of reasons req uired by Article 190
of the Treaty must disclose in a clear a.nd unequivocal fa.snion the reasoning
followed by the Community authority which adopted the easure in question
in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the reaso ns for the
measure, so that they may defend their rights and the Community judicature
may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction [ ... ]. The requiremen ts to be satisfied
by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in
particular the content of the mea.sure in question, the nature of the rea.sons
given a.nd the interest which the addressees of the mea.sw·e, or odler parties
to whom it is of direct a.nd individual concern, may have in obtaining
expla.nations (Case C-367/95 P Commission v. Sytraval dnd Brink's France
[1998] ECR 1-171 9, paragraph 63)" (emphasis added). !o,
The sufficiency of reasons in the Order as

to

a number of important elements

of the decision is open to scrutiny. In, particular, at the vety least C OM PAT
will want to examine the sufficiency of the CCl's reasons as to :
108 CEMENT, paragraph 469.
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why the CCI rejected the alternative explanations put forward by the Opposite
Parties for apparent production reductions and price movements. Opposite
Party No.6 submits that "it is misleading to conclude market shares of the
cement manufacturers based on production capacities without analyzing the actual
production patterns and the reasons for not producing to the extent ofthe installed
capacity ofeach such cement manufacturer"I09;
why the CCI selected the particular Opposite Parties as addressees of its Order,
while rejecting as insufficient the same or similar evidence in respect of other
cement manu facturers. Opposite Party No.6 submits that "it is untenable in
law that while some cement manufacturers have been charged with the allegation
ofcollusion whereas the others have been left out for no reason" ]10;

how the CCI reached a finding that there were two separate or connecred
infringements relating to both prices and production, involving eleven cement
manufacturers through the CMA (in which nOt all were found ro have participared
in the High Power Commirree meerings) and that there was an overall plan linking
all of the parties across all such elements and all regions in India;
how the CCI arrived at the level of penalty. The CCI does provide an
explanation for certain of its material decisions at the key stages of calculation
of the penal ty. In particular ir does not articulare;
the basis for the CCI's approach to calculating profitability using the ROCE
measure"] and why alte rnative measures such as IRR or NPV are not
appropriate in this case;
the basis for rhe selection of a multiplier of 0.5 per cent of profits in rhe case
of the cement manufacturers and ten per cent of revenues in rhe case ofCMA
and what factors of the allegedly infringing acrivity merir the imposition of
penalties at such a level;

109 Order, paragraph 5.5.5.
110 Order, paragraph 5.5.3.
III ROCE = Rerum on Capital Employed.
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why the CCI has treated all the cement manufacturer Opposite Parties in an
identical way without ta king into account whether their circumstances may be
di ffe rent and therefore justify a different level of penalty or any penalty at all.
In short, the failure to provide (any or sufficient) reasons with regard to the
above factors has actual or potential implications for the O pposite Parties in
terms of (a) the fi nding of liability; (b) the attribution of li ability to particular
parties; (c) the level of penalty imposed; and (d) the risk of third party damages
claims which are parasitic upon or at least related to the finding of infringement
and profit determination.
More generally, rhe limitations of the Order as ro the reasons behind the
CCl's decision raises questions about the precedent value of the decision in
developing the Indian competition law jurisprudence for the future and ro
allow other interested parties ro know their legal rights and responsibil ities in
a sufficiently precise way.
Considerations for Competition Policy
Standing back fro m the specifics of the Order, I hope that in this review I have
emphasised a number of points and when set against the wider policy and
enforcement dynamic.
Fi rst, as with any new competition law regime, inevitably the written law and
regulations, guidelines from the authority itself and human foresight cannot
cater for all issues as they come up in practice. Competition law is constantly
evolving in India and elsewhere. The CC I has been critic sed fo r not issuing
guidance in particular areas and in the specific areas of penalties. H owever, a
newer competition authority is usually prudent to adopt detailed interpretative
guidance only after it has adopted some significant decisions and usually when
the decisions have been considered by a relevant tribunal or court. Nonetheless
and critically for present purposes, this presumes that th,· decisions that the
competition authority has itself issued are well reasoned [0 allow for them to
be co nsidered by a reviewing authority (in this case COM PAn.
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Where, as here, rhere is simply no Indian guidance or precedents on key issues,
the proper course may be to annul rhe Order in its entirety, given the very
obvious risks for legal certainty and violation of due process. This observation
demonstrates the importance of rhe CCI expressing its opinion on at least the
following issues if its ongoing decisions are to withstand further challenges:
What is to be understood by the principle of an "action in concert" for the
purposes of section 3 of the Competition Act? Under what circumstances will
indirect evidence alone, or in combination with other evidence, be sufficient
to establish a violation of section 3' Is there any difference in rhe treatment
of conduct-based evidence and economic evidence? What is the nature of the
presumption of an AAE under section 3(3) of the Competition Act and does
this differ as regards the finding of an agreement or an action in concert? How
can enterprises rebut the presumption of an AAE?
Second, a key issue for COM PAT relates to rhe protection of due process and the
burden and standard of proof in competition cases. Despite the administrative
character of the procedure, competition proceedings internationally have
acquired a quasi-criminal character and the issue of the upgrading of procedural
rights in competition cases is not a new issue. In view of the significant
consequences of an authority finding a competition law infringement and the
risks of Type I errors l " in the absence of direct evidence, COMPATwill want
to adopt an approach rhat is not subject to criticism by standards regarded as
reasonable.
Third, in a newer competition regime there will often be no shortage of sources
of advice, assistance and even criticism, which can be refreshing but even quite
overwhelming. This review is offered in rhe spirit of constructive engagement.
Needless to say, the mere departure ofIndian competition law from EU, the
United States or indeed any orher international competition law is not itself a
reason for concern or criticism. If the conclusion reached by relevant decision
makers in India is that the international practice is incorrect or inappropriate for
112 Type I error and Type II error are terms used in statistics to describe panicular flaws in
a testing process, where a [rue null hypothesis was incorrccdy rejected (Type I error) or
where there is a failure to reject a false null hypothesis (Type II error),
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India, or that it should be reviewed in the face oflegal and market developments,
it would of course be appropriate ro develop an approach I hat is different for
India (and from which those other jurisdictions may also benefi t and evolve
their own approaches). However, the analytical basis for depdrting from the EU
approach as described above is not clear from the Order. To the extent that the
CCI (or COMPAT) can clear up such uncertainties or ambiguities, this would
assist Indian business and actual and potential FOI in India, as well as elevate
the esteem in which Indian competition law enforcement and its institutions
are held on the international level.
Fourth, it should not be overlooked that the practices in the EU have been
developed after lengthy experience and drawing on insights from even longer
established competition regimes, including the United States. They have their
recognised imperfections, and it is far from the author's intention to defend those
systems as without failings. Yet, moving to a system that substantially departS
from these examples, without sound and explicable reasons to distinguish them,
will invite at the very least curiosity, comment and question. T hose regimes have
of course been through their own uncertainties and problems in determining
their approach to the issues that have formed the subject-matter of this review
(not least, concerns around use of indirect evidence and the predictability of
penalties). Under these circumstances, India has an opportunity not only to
mitigate such problems, but also to contribute to addressing some of the effects
of those problems.
Finally, and this is an issue for the future efficacy of the eCl's investigation
techniques and enforcement record, it is noteworthy that in this case there
was no leniency applicant providing direct evidence of the alleged cartel.
Internationally, cartel infringement decisions tend to be less prone to judicial
challenge (at the level of liability, at least) due to the use of direct evidence
provided by a leniency applicant. I 13 Yet leniency will only tend to be attractive

113 To be dear, it is not argued mat the competition authority should rdr exclusively on such
evidence - quile the contrary. However, the provision of direct and contemporaneous
communication evidence and the obligations on the applicant to maintain co minuous
cooperation with me amhoriry substantially assist the authority to meet the evidential burden.
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if the net benefit to the enterprise of applying for leniency exceeds the real
and likely penalry that would otherwise be imposed. However, there is no
guidance in India on the likely level of penalry or the potential size of the
reduction for leniency up to the one hundred per cent maximum , other than
the differentiation for first-in and successive applicants and the practice that
can be discerned in actual cases. At the time of writing and issue of the Order,
there is no reported case in India where a parry has successfully applied for
leniency. Of course, the decision whether to apply for leniency is complex.
If granted leniency, the benefits can be as much as complete avoidance of
penalties. However, this potential benefit may be set against the possibiliry
that the practices may not be brought to the attention of the authorities at
all without such disclosure, and disclosure may increase the risk of follow-on
actions where third parties can show that they have been harmed as a result of
the alleged cartel. It is believed that guidance in the related areas of leniency
and penalties is under active consideration by the CCI. It is unclear when such
guidance will be forthcoming but it is eagerly awaited. In these circumstances,
it may be speculated whether the CCI will ever procure sufficiently compelling
evidence of a cartel, which would meet international standards of proof, unless
and until it clarifies its approach ro both leniency and penalties.
Defining the procedural framewotk that is best suited to deliver optimal results
for a newer competition law charting its way is one of the most challenging
issues of competition law, operating to support the application of the substantive
law, but never completely divorced from it. Through the lens of the cement
case, and a selective international comparative analysis, this review is aimed at
taking a small step in that direction.

ANNEX I
OECD Findings on Use of Direct Evidence in Cartel Cases
Extract from 'Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement,'
OECD February 2006, Executive Summary
«1. Circumstantial evidence is employed in cartel cases in all countries.
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Competition law enforcement officials always strive: to obtain direct
evidence of agreement in prosecuting cartel cases, but sometimes it
is not available. [ . .. J At the same time, there are limits to the use of
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, especially economic evidence,
can be ambiguous. It must be interpreted correctly by investigators,
competition agencies and courts. Importantly, circumstantial evidence
can be, and often is, used together with direct evidence.
2.

The better practice is to use circumstantial evidence olistically, giving
its cumulative effect, rather than on an item-by-item basis.
One delegate described the methodology for evaluating circumstan tial
evidence as like an impressionist painting, comprising many dots or brush
strokes which together form an image. Another likened the process to a jigsaw puzzle. In this way, circumstantial evidence, which by definition does
not describe the specific terms of an agreement, can be better understood.

[... J
3.

Complicating the use of circumstantial evidence are provisions in national
competition laws that variously define the nature of "agreements" that are
subject to the law.
The anti-cartel provisions of all competition laws apply to more than
straightforward explicit agreements. Laws use such terms as "concerted
practice" "understanding" and "arrangement."
When evaluating an evidentiary record, the nature of the agreement to
which it applies may not be fully clear. This issue arises in rhe context
of "facilitating practices." These are practices, such as information
exchanges, which can facilitate an underlying cartel agreement.
Evidence of them is circumstantial evidence of a cartel agreement,
but it is probably not sufficient by itself to prove such an agreement.

4.

There are two general types of circumstantial evidence: commun ication
evidence and economic evidence. Of the twO, communication evidence
is considered to be the more important.
Communication evidence is evidence that cartel o perators met or
otherwise co mmunicated, but does not describe the su bstance of
their communications. It includes, for example, records of telephone
conversations among suspected cartel participants, of their travel to a
common destination and notes or records of meetinos in which they
participated. Communication evidence can be highly probative of an
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agreement. Almost all of the circumstantial cases described by delegations
included communication evidence; in some the evidence was compelling.
5.

Economic evidence is almost always ambiguous. It could be consistent
with either agreement or independent action. Therefore it requires careful
analysis.

[...J
6.

National treatment of cartels, such as whether they are prosecuted as
crimes or as administrative violations, can affect the butden of proof that
appl ies to the cases, and hence the use of ci rcumstantial evidence.

In most countries, cartels <and other violations of the competition
law) are prosecuted administratively. The prin ciple administrative
sanctions applied to this co nduct are fines, usually only assessed against
organisations but sometimes against natural persons, and remedial orders.
In a minoriry of countries, but a growing one, cartels are prosecuted
criminally.

[... J
7. It can be difficult to convince courtS to accept circumstantial evidence in
cartel cases, especially where the potentialliabiliry for having violated the
anti-cartel provisions of the competition law is high.
A few jurisdictions in which there has been judicial review of decisions
by competition agencies in cartel cases reported that courts sometimes
view cases built on circumstantial evidence with scepticism.

[.. .J
8.

There are circumstances in countries that are relatively new to anticartel enforcement that could affect the extent to which they rely on
circumstantial evidence in their cases.
A country JUSt beginning to enforce its competition law may face obstacles
in obtaining direct evidence of a cartel agreement. It probably will not have
in place an effective leniency programme, which is a primary source of
direct evidence. There may be lacking in the country a strong competition
culture, which could make it more difficult for the competirion agency
to generate co-operation with its anti-cartel programme. In short, the
competition agency could have relatively greater difficulry in generating
direct evidence in its cartel cases, which would imply that it will have to
rely more heavily on circumstantial evidence. [... J
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[... J
The competition agency should strive to generate good cartel cases in important
sectors, supported by strong evidence and demonstrati g the benefi ts to
consumers of effective anti-cartel enforcement" (emphasis added). "·

ANNEX II
Calculating the Penalty under EU Competition Law
The summary below outlines the principles which determine the European
Commission's calculation of penalties in EU competition cases.

Introduction and Overview
The European Commission may by decision impose fines on ndertaki ngs and
associations of undertakings (i.e., trade associations) where, either intentionally
or negligently:
(a)
(b)

they infringe Article 101 or Article 102 of the TFEU; or
they contravene a decision of the European Commission ordering interim
measures; or

(c)

they fail to comply with a commitment made binding by a decision of
the European Commission.

For each undertaking and association of undertakings pan:icipating in the
infringemem, the fine shall not exceed 10 per cent ofits total turnover in the
preceding business year.
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to
the duration of the infringemem, as explained further below.

Methodologies and Principles
The 2006 Fining Guidelines set out the normal methodology for the calculation
of a fine in paragraphs 13 to 17 and 19 to 34. In summaty, the steps under the
normal methodology are:
114 Sup ra note 23.
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I.

To take an individual participant's turnover in the goods or services
to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant
geographic area within the EEA11S during the last full business year of the
participant's involvement in the infringement ("value of sales");

2.

To multiply the value of sales by a percentage of up
reflect the "graviry" of the infringe ment;

3.

To multiply (2) by the number of years of "duration" of the infringement;

4.

To add, in the case of certain horiwntal infringements, 15 to 25 per cent
of the individual participant's value of sales for "entry fee deterrence."

5.

Steps (1) - (4) produce a figure called the "basic amount."

6.

To adjust the basic amount for any "aggravating circumstances";

7.

To adjust the basic amount for "mitigating circumstances";

8.

To adjust the res ulting figure for "overall deterrence" in certain defined

to

30 per cent

to

circumstances;

9.

To reduce the resulting fine for "leniency."

Paragraph 18 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines provides that the European
Commiss ion may employ an alternative methodology where it considers that
(i) the geographic scope of the infringement extends beyond the EEA; and (ii)
the normal methodology, as outlined above, would not properly reflect the
weight of each undertaking in the infringement. The latter may be the case,
in particular, with worldwide market-sharing arrangements .
In each methodology, the steps outlined above are the same except that, in
the alternative methodology, the "value of sales" is calculated by taking the
aggregate sales of the goods or services to which the infringement relates in
the relevant geographic area (e.g., worldwide), determining the share of these
sales of each undertaking participating in the infringement and then applying
the percentage to the aggregate sales within the EEA of those participating in
the infringement.
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Where the infringement of an association relates to the activities of its members,
the fine shall not exceed 10 per cent of the sum of the total turnover of each
member active on the market affected by the infringement of the association.
When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of
the turnover of its members and the association is not solvent, the association
is obliged to call for contributions from its members to cover the amou nt of the
fine. Where such contributions have not been made to the ssociation within
a time-limit set by the European Commission, the European Commission
may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakin gs whose
representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of the
association. After the Eutopean Commission has required payment on this basis,
where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine, the European Commission
may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association
which were active on the market on which the infringement occurred. H owever,
the European Commi s~ion shall not require payment from undertakings which
show that they have not implemented the infringing decision of the association
and either were not aware of its existence or have actively distanced themselves
from it before the European Commission started investigat ing the case. The
financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine
shall not exceed 10 per cent of its total turnover in the preceding business year.
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